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Zimbabwe’s investments in agriculture, after a 
contested Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
(FTLRP) underpinned by often violent land 
occupations (these were largely contained by 
the state by 2005), have triggered a debate 
on the meaning and import of ‘international 
land grabs’ (Matondi 2015). Internationally, 
the debates have been increasing, with the 
drive towards the cultivation of feedstock for 
the production of renewable fuel being one 
driving force. The mandatory blending of bio-
fuels in national fuel stocks has been accepted 
and today 62 countries have introduced man-
datory blending, with South Africa introduc-
ing a target of 2% blending in October 2014. 
It is in respect of the emerging trends that 
we sought to decipher the meaning of ‘land 
grabs’, ‘international land grabs’ and ‘agri-
cultural investments’ as these mean different 
things in different contexts. A key observa-
tion that provides contrarian analysis is the 
material fact that the FTLRP was an ‘inter-
nal’, instigated and implemented programme 
that does not conform to externally driven 
‘land grabs’ of an international nature. Based 
on this differentiation, this paper sought to 
understand: 1) the interest and role of the 
Zimbabwe government and its contribution 
to the first large-scale private investments 
undertaken by GreenFuel in Chisumbanje; 
2) the impact of the project on local commu-
nities’ land rights and livelihoods; 3) the role 
of the local institutions, be they technical or 
administrative in facilitating and mediating 
investment, particularly on land; 4) the capac-
ity of local and national institutions to struc-
ture a land agreement palatable to the local 
communities; and 5) the role of GreenFuel as 
the land users. 
In order to answer these broad questions, 
fieldwork at the local level in Chisumbanje was 
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key in interfacing with the different actors on 
the land issue, by understanding what roles 
they were playing. We commenced with the 
premise that the community of Chipinge 
District, (see Map 1) in which Chisumbanje is 
located, has a rich history of contestations 
over land, and has been affected by forced 
land transfers and dispossession numerous 
times during the colonial era, from 1923 when 
the first Sabi-Lundi Master Plan was designed, 
until it was fully operationalised with the set-
ting of the experimental station in the middle 
of the 1960s. In addition, Chiefs in the area, 
based on customary systems, have moved 
people to create new villages and open new 
lands, while local authorities (in colonial times 
District Administrators and today Rural Dis-
trict Councils) also transferred land for new 
business centres and a variety of development 
projects. However, in the large-scale com-
mercial farming sector, land changed hands 
through market means (willing seller–willing 
buyer), yet with customary systems the Trib-
al land Development Corporation (TILCOR), 
now the Agricultural and Rural Development 
Authority (ARDA), became a major player in 
the development of the now communal land 
taking over the Sabi-Lundi Master Plan, in 
areas where most communal land is found. 
The meaning of this history is that commu-
nities have endured decades of land trans-
fers that span over 100 years, thus defining 
Chipinge as a site of struggle by a variety of 
interest groups. It is in this context that the 
GreenFuel investments cannot just be seen 
as an expression of land ownership and use, 
but rather as the whole genre of economic 
development and the path that agriculture 
needs to take into the future. Interrogating 
the role of government as a land authority, 
as well as its capacity to work with local com-
munities and GreenFuel, was a key aspect of 
this research work. Nonetheless, government 
functionaries with a long history in the area – 
in the form of ARDA – shaped our understand-
ings of modernisation and development, as a 
colonial construct of the 1960s, in particular 
when both the Rhodesian colonial govern-
ment and Government of Zimbabwe strategi-
cally sought to substitute for fuel imports by 
producing ethanol domestically from 1972 to 
1992. The land crisis goes back all the way to 
this period. 
Framing the key questions 
and issues
In order to understand land issues in Chisum-
banje, three conceptual approaches have 
been adopted for the study: 
1)  Land governance analysis: This approach 
focuses on the effectiveness of the state 
and private sector in managing land as 
a contested policy process, and on how 
strategies and programmes either solve 
land problems or accentuate them. As 
investment decisions are formulated, a 
key question is the extent to which com-
munities with rights to land are or are 
not part and parcel of the project design, 
and how they are affected as the project 
expanded from its initial design. For the 
project to take root, the key production 
factors were, of course, land and water. 
We assessed the decision making and 
governmental systems and processes at 
play in mediating issues that arose. The 
Chisumbanje Ethanol Project managed 
to build comprehensive processes of 
stakeholder engagement, in which those 
directly affected as well as other interest-
ed parties were involved, but to differing 
degrees. When working in local commu-
nities, it is paramount to take on board 
the views of minorities and the voices 
of the most vulnerable in society before 
making decisions. 
2)  Power analysis: The framework also 
adopted a power analysis to address 
questions on the project systems, struc-
tures and processes: Who are the driv-
ers/blockers to negotiating land rights 
in large investments and why? Who sets 
the local land policy agenda? Whose 
ideas and values dominate decisions on 
land allocation for any form of invest-
ment? Given available land, who gets 
what, and when and how do they get it? 
How do formal institutions shape the dis-
tribution of costs and benefits of land as 
a key resource? How do informal social 
networks shape local land allocation pro-
cesses? Power analysis places emphasis 
on understanding the formal and infor-
mal power underpinning decisions on 
how land is distributed, in the context 
where there are powerful actors (with 
money) requiring land against communi-
ResearchReport
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ty power, holding on to a history of land 
utilisation that in itself defines the char-
acter of power in negotiating for large-
scale investments. 
3)  Countervailing community power: Com-
munities are not usually powerless as 
assumed, and Scott (1985) showed how 
they use passive power to deal with state 
authority and private investors. The case 
of Chisumbanje shows that communities 
can invest in direct conflict with the state 
and government, and in the process 
obtain concessions. In most cases, com-
munities, as the less privileged, use cul-
tural power, past agreements and their 
majority to claim and reclaim their stake. 
Cast in a framework of broader devel-
opment, countervailing power falls in 
five categories: a) cultural mobilisation; 
b) the use of soft forms of lobby by com-
munities, if and when they lose the land 
game; c) the use of counter livelihood 
rights to induce government and the 
company to access land; d) picketing at 
governance institutions and the compa-
ny to get the land concessions; and e) the 
ability to negotiate strategically with dif-
ferent types of actors, especially commu-
nity activists such as non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), community-based 
organisations (CBOs), war veterans and 
traditional leaders.
Background to the study  
and the field site
Stake on land-related matters
To date, Zimbabwe has not developed a 
comprehensive national land or agricultural 
policy. However, regional policy frameworks 
prescribe a broad direction for agricultural 
policy, for example, the vision at the South-
ern African Development Community (SADC) 
level is ‘to promote development of an effi-
cient, competitive and sustainable agricul-
ture sector, which assures food security and 
increased income’ (Southern African Develop-
ment Community 2011). In line with this vision, 
Zimbabwe has had a draft agricultural policy 
since 2013, aimed at increasing production 
for both household and national food secu-
rity; increasing funding for agricultural infra-
structure and the sector; improving produce 
quality; improving production technology; 
preserving natural resources; and effectively 
managing and administrating land reform. 
The study explored the political and policy 
positioning of the Chisumbanje Ethanol Pro-
ject at national level, in terms of the power 
play, the actors and the implications of the 
investment on the national land investment 
policy and related controversial issues of com-
munity displacement, as indicated in numer-
ous studies (Hall 2011; Zamchiya 2011; Mutopo 
and Chiweshe 2012; Mandihlare 2013; Tigere 
2013; Thondhlana 2014). The displacement 
discourse is clouded by uncertainties around 
who actually owns the land. In our research 
we sought to establish this matter, given 
that the Chisumbanje land is not Fast Track 
Land and is in communal areas. From the lit-
erature cited, the number of displaced is also 
not clear, nor on which particular land, mak-
ing it impossible to definitively conclude that 
communities have been displaced or that the 
company has displaced them. 
Out of the 1 008 families who lost land, 172 
families were compensated with 0.5ha of 
irrigated land. In the Chisumbanje area the 
ten affected villages are Tazwa 1, Tazwa 2, 
Guwarekipi, Madhwayi 1, Madhwayi 2, Mad-
hwayi 3, Mazembe, Vhutuza, Muyondozi and 
Ndofeni. In Chinyamukwakwa, 388 families 
out of the 694 families affected were com-
pensated, again with 0.5ha of irrigated land1. 
Some of the analyses published to date have 
not taken into account that GreenFuel as a 
company does not deal with land issues at 
policy level, and that they went into Chisum-
banje fully aware that ARDA had some estates 
not used. In fact, ARDA directs them on the 
plan and where they needed to invest in the 
land. To then accuse the company of directly 
displacing the communities without pointing 
a finger at the state makes the whole read-
ing of current literature contradictory. After 
going through the different approaches of 
research done by many of the referred schol-
ars, we found that most of them had not 
spoken to the company authorities to hear 
their side of the story. Our view is that per-
spectives across the various actors need to be 
established, and how land decisions are being 
made to be put this investment in its proper 
context.
1 There is also contestation 
around the correct figures, for 
instance, the company says 176 
families have been compen-
sated in the Chisumbanje area, 
while interviews with other 
informants say the figure is 
172. However, what is clear is 
the general consensus on most 
of the issues except the exact 
ownership of the land. 
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Chisumbanje production model and 
its performance
The Chisumbanje and Middle Sabi Estates 
are protected by the ARDA Act, as the land 
belongs to ARDA; it is a partnership between 
ARDA, Macdom Investments and Rating 
Investments. The Chisumbanje Ethanol Pro-
ject is a public-private partnership between 
the government through ARDA, under the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and 
Irrigation Development (MoAMID). ARDA 
was formed in 1965 (as TILCOR) with its major 
role to boost agricultural production and 
rural development, as well as productive uti-
lisation of state land, especially in communal 
areas. ARDA leasing land from Chipinge Rural 
District Council (RDC) was central to the ini-
tial offer of land on a lease basis to Green-
Fuel in Chisumbanje. All land is owned by 
the state and administered by the Ministry of 
Lands and Rural Resettlement (MLRR), which 
to date has not provided a statement on the 
Chisumbanje Project, this ostensibly because 
the land is statutorily owned by MoAMID.
The Chisumbanje main investor is a local Zim-
babwean company called GreenFuel with sub-
sidiary companies (Macdom Investments and 
Rating Investments). Government, through 
ARDA, invested US$36.7 million in land and 
immovable assets and Macdom Investments 
injected the capital and hold a 90% stake in 
GreenFuel, while the government has a 10% 
stake. The total investment into GreenFuel 
is US$230 million (GreenFuel undated). The 
project utilises ARDA estates to grow sugar-
cane for ethanol blending. The Chisumbanje 
Ethanol Plant (GreenFuel) is a Zimbabwean 
company operating subsidiaries producing 
sugarcane as Macdom Investments in Chisum-
banje and Rating Investments in Middle Sabi, 
which is 80km from Chisumbanje. Chisum-
banje has 8 500ha of sugarcane, while Middle 
Sabi has 3 500ha. The combined total, in the 
new land opened in Nuanetsi of 1 000ha, pro-
vides a total of 13 000ha for 2015 (GreenFuel 
undated). The government of Zimbabwe, rep-
resented by its agricultural investment arm 
ARDA, started as a Build-Operate-Transfer 
contract and later on changed to a joint ven-
ture in 2012. ARDA leases the land from the 
Chipinge RDC. The sugarcane produced from 
the two estates is processed by GreenFuel into 
ethanol at a plant located in Chisumbanje 
(Zuze GreenFuel 2014).
GreenFuel also has an out-grower model of 
production with smallholder producers that it 
assists with a full package of support, includ-
ing canal development, water provision, till-
age and inputs. The issue of out-growers 
raises an important analytical dimension 
with respect to the inclusivity of the business 
model in the Chisumbanje sugarcane bio-eth-
anol value chain. Interviews with senior com-
pany officials revealed that there are 116 out-
growers on 400ha of land and 125 war veter-
ans on 250ha of land. However, the model is 
a unique model in that the farmers are not 
much involved in the production but are just 
land holders; the company does everything 
for them and pays them at the end of every 
harvest. From the company’s perspective, this 
is because the farmers do not have expertise 
in producing the expected quality of sugar-
cane required for the production of ethanol. 
This means smallholder farmers are automati-
cally excluded from actively participating in 
the primary production because of the sugar-
cane quality requirements for processing. 
However, there are inconsistencies when it 
comes to out-grower schemes. In an interview 
one out-grower lamented: 
When they cut the sugarcane, we asked 
about the position of our fields and we 
sought audience with the investor, but the 
investor said ‘ARDA did not tell me that 
there are settler farmers within the land’, 
but promised to give us back our land and 
the sugarcane after the first ratoon.2  When 
he harvested the first harvest, we then asked 
about the position of our fields but nothing 
concrete came out of it. As we speak, the 
company owes us more than $300 000 for 
three seasons which we were not paid. 
When we asked he said, he is not selling 
the ethanol so he cannot pay. Now that he 
is selling again he is still not paying (Key 
informant interview 2014). 
The company buys sugarcane from the farm-
ers at US$4/tonne and the expected yield 
per hectare is 135 tonnes. In Middle Sabi, 
there is a plan to develop 6 000ha for the 
out-grower scheme under the A2 model 
– the model of medium-scale farms, estab-
lished after Fast Track Land Reform (Zuze 
GreenFuel 2014). Though there was agree-
ment about the US$4/tonne selling price, the 
out-growers are now comparing prices with 
2   Ratoon is a product that is 
found after a process of ration-
ing, which is a practice of grow-
ing a crop from the stubbles 
of previous crop. The ratoon 
can save costs on preparatory 
tillage and planting material; 
it gets the benefit of residual 
manure and moisture; ratoon 
crops mature earlier and give 
more or less same yield as new 
sugarcane cane. In general, 
only one ratoon should be 
taken because the incidence of 
pests and diseases increases and 
deterioration of soil can take 
place if it is done several times.
ResearchReport
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Triangle and Hippo Valley out-growers who are 
being paid US$7/tonne, a difference ofUS$3/
tonne, and the farmers have not yet been 
paid the US$4/tonne since 2010 (Maara Par-
liamentary Portfolio Committee 2014). Under 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), 
Macdom admits that it still owes the farmers 
US$178 000 (Macdom Investments (Private) 
Limited and ARDA Chisumbanje Settler 
Scheme Farmers 2013).
The ARDA Chisumbanje Settler Scheme Farm-
ers (116) signed a MoU with Macdom Invest-
ments, where Macdom developed the out-
grower’s land and established a sugarcane 
crop thereon. It has been maintaining the 
crop together with the land and its related 
works. The out-growers have agreed to reim-
burse Macdom for all the capital expenditure 
incurred in the development of the land and 
sugarcane crop, as well as all associated main-
tenance and operation costs (Macdom Invest-
ments (Private) Limited and ARDA Chisum-
banje Settler Scheme Farmers 2013). The total 
amount the out-growers in Chisumbanje owe 
to Macdom in development and maintenance 
fees is US$2.4 million, which the out-growers 
will pay via stop order for a period of three 
years (Macdom Investments (Private) Limited 
and ARDA Chisumbanje Settler Scheme Farm-
ers 2013). However, after the three seasonal 
years, the out-growers will choose to either 
sell to Macdom or to any other company that 
buys sugarcane. Under the agreement, Mac-
dom is obliged to supply water for irrigation 
purposes, as well as other seasonal inputs nec-
essary for the production of mercantile qual-
ity sugarcane on the out-growers’ plots.
Out-growers could potentially benefit from 
GreenFuel, given that it has the exclusive 
licence to supply ethanol for mandatory 
blending with petrol. However, recently Trian-
gle Valley provided ethanol for blending with 
petrol after GreenFuel had run short for man-
datory blending. GreenFuel, which is the only 
company licensed to produce ethanol to meet 
the 20% mandatory blending with petrol, has 
9 100ha (inclusive of 660ha of out-grower 
farmers and settlers) under sugarcane, supply-
ing an ethanol plant with an annual produc-
tion capacity of 120 million litres. Seventy-four 
million litres of ethanol have been produced 
so far, with 54 million being produced in 
2014. GreenFuel can potentially achieve yields 
of 130 tonnes per hectare. However, due to 
unpredictable water and electricity supplies, 
an average yield of 120 tonnes of sugarcane 
per hectare and 70 litres of ethanol from 
one tonne of sugarcane has been achieved. 
Water and electricity are very expensive costs 
to the project and not conducive to an invest-
ment environment (GreenFuel undated). By 
2030, the expected sugarcane output will 
be 4.8 million tonnes from 40 000ha, which 
will be converted to approximately 320 mil-
lion litres of ethanol per annum for supply to 
Zimbabwe and SADC (South Africa mainly, 
which shall soon introduce a 2% mandatory 
blending in petrol when it does not produce 
enough ethanol). Currently GreenFuel is gen-
erating 18MW using 282 495 tonnes of bag-
gasse (ibid.).
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Large-scale sugarcane 
investments from a global 
and national lens
International guidelines  
and relevance for Zimbabwe
Of the major initiatives taken lately at an 
international level, to regulate large-scale 
land deals, is the formulation of international 
guidelines, including the World Bank Princi-
ples for Responsible Agricultural Investment; 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and 
Forests, as well as the Minimum Core Human 
Rights Principles of the UN Special Rappor-
teur on the Right to Food. The FAO Voluntary 
Guidelines, endorsed by the Committee on 
World Food Security (May 2012) is widely pub-
licised and the most recent global initiative 
for the regulation of land tenure in general, 
and large-scale farm investments in particu-
lar. The FAO guidelines were more inclusive 
than the World Bank principles in their for-
mulation process (White et al 2012); they are 
also a lot more ‘holistic’ in their approach, 
where land rights are characterised by being 
‘inextricably linked with access to and man-
agement of other natural resources’ (Preface 
of the FAO Voluntary Guidelines 2012; the 
United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (UNECA) 2014 land policy guidelines). 
In the context of the Chisumbanje ethanol 
investment, loss of land use rights by local 
communities has brought about a wide range 
of consequences in terms of loss of access 
to various other natural resources, includ-
ing water, grazing lands and forest woods, 
on which local livelihoods depend. Yet these 
problems are precisely the reason why, at the 
AU level, priority is given to creating guide-
lines upon which countries may craft relevant 
policies. The reasons are glaringly obvious: 
a widespread alienation of land from local 
communities with contested or inadequate 
compensation packages, smallholder produc-
ers are marginalised in favour of large-scale 
investors who received better protection and 
gender-based inequalities are highlighted. 
Underlying factors include weak land govern-
ance and administration systems, which fail 
to protect the land rights of communities, 
claims which are not responded to because of 
weak democratic governance and institutions 
(UNECA 2014). This discord also applies to 
the unequal power relations of investors and 
communities, where government at times is 
absent, unwilling or complicit in the contract 
negotiations. But at the end of the day, fiscal 
revenue pressures lead to favourable conces-
sions to investors who may face high costs of 
doing business, volatile institutional and com-
munity arrangements, high transaction and 
settling costs, and failure to resolve conflicts 
that flare up every year. The Chisumbanje 
Project has faced these complex difficulties, 
prompting the need for negotiations towards 
a win-win solution for both communities and 
the company so that the economic multiplier 
effect of its presence and product ranges can 
be appreciated.
In Zimbabwe there remains no clear land 
policy to guide land administration. The 
Chisumbanje Ethanol Project provides an 
example of the necessity of a comprehensive 
land policy to complement the energy policy, 
which seems to be a priority of government. 
This means for any future investments in 
energy, which require land even beyond the 
customary systems, there is a need for clarity 
and guidelines should be followed on agricul-
tural practices that support other sectors, such 
that energy can fit into the wider context of 
land reform to support smallholder commer-
cial agriculture. One possible way of enforc-
ing such voluntary international guidelines 
is through their incorporation into national 
laws, which then give rise to statutory rights 
and responsibilities. This, however, reinforces 
the state-centric approach in the govern-
ance of land deals, since it gives the ultimate 
discretion to the state to decide on whether 




Zimbabwe national land 
investment guidelines
Land policy framework
Zimbabwe last developed its land policy in 
the 1990s with the objective of redistribut-
ing about five million hectares of commercial 
land for resettlement on a willing buyer-will-
ing seller basis. There were various attempts 
to revise the policy at the end of the 1990s 
without success but the programme for land 
transfer continued anyway, which facilitated 
engagement between civil society, govern-
ment, funding agencies and the international 
community towards developing a programme 
of resettlement. But this was overtaken by the 
FTLRP. Government had to rely on a raft of 
legal instruments and constitutional amend-
ments to effect fast track land reform because 
it had no policy underpinning it. And these 
legal instruments became de facto policy but 
limited only to land as a resource; less impor-
tance was placed on fisheries and conservan-
cies because the key priority was the transfer 
of land from those with the land to those 
without. Therefore, though international 
guidelines were developed in principle, they 
hardly speak to Zimbabwe’s land reform. 
Government development  
and land management institutions
Given the yawning gap on land policy during 
the time of the inclusive government from 
2009–2013, investors had to rely on ad hoc 
communities, while having to deal with local 
stakeholders complaining on behalf of the 
communities on the matter of land displace-
ment. Curiously, ARDA, on whose land the 
project has been carried out, has been rath-
er mute when land-related matters are dis-
cussed because it provided the land on a lease 
basis as part of its contribution to the project. 
The expectation that ARDA would clarify the 
land ownership and lease arrangement has 
not been fully explained, leaving GreenFuel 
to defend the project on land-related mat-
ters, which should ideally be a privy of gov-
ernment. 
However, government did set up an inter-
ministerial task force during the tenure of 
the inclusive government, led by the Deputy 
Prime Minister. The conclusion drawn by the 
task force was that the Chisumbanje Ethanol 
Project was of strategic and national impor-
tance, with the potential for reviving industry. 
But beyond the national importance, there 
were three interrelated problems: the role 
of the community, technical-related prob-
lems and the business model. The task force 
sought solutions for balancing the interests, 
as a basis for providing a win-win scenario 
for these three potentially conflicting areas 
of interests. The task force was disbanded at 
the conclusion of the Government of National 
Unity (GNU) in July 2013, and a new govern-
ment took over and put up a new programme 
of resettling households, led by the Chipinge 
RDC and the District Administrator (DA) 
under the Ministry of Local Government and 
National Housing.
Some of the key institutions that were part 
of District Ethanol Production Committee 
(DEPIC) took responsibility for land matters 
after July 2013. These are the: 
• Chipinge Rural District Council (RDC): 
The land that the ethanol project is 
on falls under the jurisdiction of the 
Chipinge RDC. In terms of the laws of 
the country, the Chipinge RDC adminis-
ters all communal lands and Old Reset-
tlement Areas, as well as areas of des-
ignated growth points. The role of the 
local authority comes in if the company 
needs to expand: they need to engage 
with the Chipinge RDC as they are the 
land authority. The allocation of the 
0.5ha to the farmers who lost their land 
is a process which involves the RDC, the 
company, Agritex and the Department 
of Irrigation in the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, and allocation was based on those 
who lost their land during expansion. 
When the investment expanded into the 
Chisumbanje area, which is communal 
but earmarked for the ethanol project, 
the 0.5ha compensation was factored in. 
According to the Chipinge RDC, the peo-
ple knew that the area was earmarked 
for expansion and no one built houses 
on the land they cultivated. The settler 
farmers have leases with the Ministry 
of Lands and Rural Resettlement, and 
Council has leased the land which Mac-
dom now occupies as well as the small-
scale schemes where households have 
been compensated with 0.5ha plots. 
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By April 2015, a partial solution by 
Chipinge RDC and the DA’s office seems 
to have been found, where GreenFu-
el invested in a community irrigation 
scheme alongside the opening of new 
land. This meant that of the 1 008 dis-
placed families, only seven remained 
and the RDC was in the process of mak-
ing frantic efforts for them to be accom-
modated in the 0.5ha scheme. Accord-
ing to the District Administrator of 
Chipinge, supply for the 0.5ha was being 
outstripped by demand in a context in 
which there was initial heavy resistance 
to the scheme. This gradual acceptance 
has been caused by improved (but at 
times volatile) relations between Green-
Fuel and the community, and more vis-
ible signs of GreenFuel investments 
beyond the sugarcane farms. Improved 
performance of the initial beneficiaries 
of the 0.5ha set an example and when 
compared to the performance of the cot-
ton sector and the banana sector, which 
was underperforming, sugarcane at least 
provided an income for the households 
who benefited.
• Traditional leaders: De facto all commu-
nal area residents have enjoyed custom-
ary land rights well before any colonial 
and post-colonial governments. There-
fore, all communal land is de facto, vest-
ed in the community and families and 
administered by the traditional leader-
ship (Rukuni  1994). De jure, however, 
all communal land vests in the President 
who permits it to be occupied and used 
in terms of the provisions of the Com-
munal Land Act (Shivji et al 1998), and 
administered by the RDC and the lower 
echelons of local government described 
earlier. The contradictions and contesta-
tion between de facto and de jure signify 
the nature of contemporary challenges 
with the governance structures and the 
functioning/dysfunctioning of these 
structures in discharging land manage-
ment responsibilities. It is a consistent 
problem that plays out clearly in the case 
of the Chisumbanje Ethanol Project. 
Civil society players and consumer 
organisations
The Platform for Youth Development (PYD) 
is the most significant pressure group that 
has been ‘fighting for the land rights of the 
community’ in Chisumbanje. The PYD has 
been working with the villagers on this mat-
ter since 2008. It has engaged Zimbabwe 
Lawyers for Human Rights, who filed a court 
application at the High Court of Zimbabwe to 
stop Macdom and her sister companies from 
encroaching outside the boundaries they 
have agreed on with ARDA. The PYD was also 
involved in the now defunct District Ethanol 
Production Committee (DEPIC). International 
civil society players from Switzerland, such as 
the Federation of European Philatelic Asso-
ciations (FEPA) (a continental federation of 43 
national European federations undertaking 
support work to the PYD through solidarity 
with the affected communities), Kirchliche 
Arbeitsstelle Sudliches Afrika (KASA) (an ecu-
menical service that works with civil society 
and churches on social and economic human 
rights and their political implementation), and 
Solidarity Fund for Social Liberation Struggles 
in the Third World (SOLIFONDS) (which works 
on indigenous land rights) petitioned by the 
ethanol investor, GreenFuel and its owner 
Billy Rautenbach, to respect and honour exist-
ing land boundaries and ensure that the local 
Chisumbanje and Chinyamukwakwa villagers 
continue to survive and feed their families. 
FEPA, KASA, SOLIFONDS and other partners 
urged GreenFuel to respect dialogue with 
Chisumbanje and Chinyamukwakwa commu-
nities as a way of solving the existing land 
conflict. 
The PYD has consistently fought for the rights 
of communities, including just payment of 
workers employed by the company. The con-
sistency of this lobby has made it possible to 
highlight community rights and to pressure 
both government and GreenFuel to respond 
through a variety of community initiatives. 
According to GreenFuel, they also envisage a 
situation of balanced reporting of the posi-
tives they have undertaken, and acknowl-
edged that the land rights matter could have 
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been handled differently had they had the 
assistance of government. They emphasise 
that they produce a wide variety of products, 
more than 1 000 companies benefit from the 
investment, they have a variety of Commu-
nity Social Responsibility programmes, and 
they have increased their employment to 9 
100 workers in an economic situation where 
elsewhere there are more job lay-offs than 
jobs created.
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Acquisition of land in 
communal areas
The Chisumbanje Ethanol Project is a unique 
project in that it acts contrary to the Fast 
Track Land Reform Programme that took land 
from white farmers for redistribution to the 
black poor farmers. In this case, the state has 
supported the removal of rural households 
from what the people of Chisumbanje con-
sider their communal farming land (Thond-
hana 2014). Biofuel development activities 
have acquired communal land, despite the 
fact that such land is integrated into rural 
communities’ livelihood practices, which 
depend on agriculture and natural resources 
(Cotula and Vermeulen 2009). This trajectory 
of land acquisition is in sharp contrast with 
the new wave of twenty-first century global 
land reform, which aims to redress insecuri-
ties from colonial policies that arose in the 
twentieth century (Hall 2011). Among the 
fundamental concerns was that the land that 
falls under communal land was acquired by 
private investors for commercial purposes. 
The manner in which private investors 
acquired land under customary use and own-
ership for the investment is a concern. Com-
munity issues ranged from forced relocation 
of families to the failure to provide fair com-
pensation for the land taken by the project – 
including those under the state agency ARDA. 
At the height of the crisis between the com-
pany and the communities in Chisumbanje 
and Chinyamukwakwa, Cabinet set up the 
District Ethanol Project Implementation Com-
mittee (DEPIC), comprising traditional chiefs, 
area legislators, the district administrator, 
councillors, police, members of the President’s 
office and community representatives, includ-
ing NGOs (the PYD). The DEPIC was working 
towards resolving problems between the 
company and the communities.
Displacement discourse  
and its contestation
Field interviews showed that most displaced 
farmers complained that they were neither 
consulted nor formally advised about the 
land acquisition agreements before the land 
clearance commenced (Focus Group Discus-
sion May 2014). GreenFuel responded that 
though they are the producers, the lease of 
ARDA binds them, which is in the forefront 
of handling land issues and negotiating with 
the communities. This is where it gets entan-
gled in a maze of complexity, because ARDA 
and government indicate there are no issues, 
given that the Chisumbanje Project has been 
given national status. This implies that land 
rights of communities are dealt with accord-
ing to government on the basis of its national 
programmes, such as land allocation. A key 
informant interviewee noted that:
The coming of GreenFuel saw one thousand 
and eight (1 008) farmers losing their land 
that ranged from 2ha–40ha to the company, 
and out of the 1 008 from Chisumbanje, only 
172 farmers were compensated with 0.5ha 
irrigation schemes per family. The company 
had slashed down crops that belonged to the 
farmers during land clearance and takeover, 
and only compensated the farmers with 
US$3.00/ha. Now the community is failing to 
send their children to school because they do 
not have the land to till and have no jobs. 
The few who have been employed are not 
being paid up; employees at GreenFuel have 
gone for more than three months without 
pay despite the company now selling the 
ethanol produced (Key informant interview 
2014).
However, the consultations were confined to 
the chief, Chief Garahwa, and the Chipinge 
RDC, and the Ethanol Project went ahead 
without the people’s approval. According 
to Chief Garahwa, although the company 
brought about irrigation schemes as compen-
sation to those who lost their land, several 
problems bedevil the whole issue. 
The first issue is that the people here are not 
used to irrigation plots, hence the reluctance 
to accept such plots and in the beginning 
people were resisting such. The second issue 
is an issue of compensation itself, those 
Land for sugar investments 
in Chisumbanje
3 There is also contestation 
round the correct figures, for 
instance, the company says 176 
families have been compen-
sated in Chisumbanje area, 
while interviews with other 
informants say the figure is 
172. However, what is clear is 
the general consensus on most 
of the issues except the exact 
ownership of the land.
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who lost their crops were not adequately 
compensated and out of the over 1 000 
people who lost their land in Chisumbanje, 
only 172 were compensated with the 0.5ha 
irrigation plots. We expected the investment 
to benefit the community to a greater extent 
since it took land away from the community, 
changing the livelihood patterns of the 
local people. However, this seems not to 
be happening as the company is no longer 
fulfilling its promises. My people expected 
to be involved in the sugarcane production 
as out-growers or contract farmers, but as 
of now only a few people are involved in 
sugarcane production as out-growers and I 
have been asking the company to provide 
me with a list of the out-growers but 
nothing has been done so far. As the Chief 
I recommend the company go back to the 
promises they made from the beginning 
and improve on their relationship with the 
community for the investment is of national 
strategic importance (Chief Garahwa, 2014).
What shocked the community was that the 
company ‘acquired 40 000ha’ of land that 
included land belonging to settlers who had 
valid lease agreements with ARDA and land 
that belonged to the community under com-
munal land, without any form of consulta-
tion. Asked about the lack of consultation in 
a meeting that was between the company 
and the community, the GreenFuel Assistant 
General Manger, Raphael Zuze, said, ‘Why 
do you think we should consult you and who 
are you? We consulted the Chief and the DA!’ 
(Key informant interview 2014) There was also 
the use of intimidation and the investor’s dis-
respectful attitude, supported by state agen-
cies such as the police (Thondhlana 2014).
Conflicts over land allocation 
to communities
Conflict arose between the government 
and the investors on one side and the small-
scale farming communities on the other. In 
Chipinge the conflict involves the Agriculture 
and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) in 
partnership with GreenFuel versus communal 
as well as resettled farmers who have land 
offer letters on ARDA land. Some of the issues 
at the centre of the conflict include displace-
ment, which needs thorough understanding:
According to the local MP (Enock Porusingazi), 
to enter into the joint agreement, the compa-
ny used the correct channels and those who 
mattered were approached. People knew the 
boundaries of ARDA and ARDA did not have 
sufficient resources to utilise the land and vil-
lagers occupied the idle land and ARDA simply 
reclaimed its land. Even the greater Chisum-
banje plan (Bechtel Report 1985) showed the 
need for expansion. This, according to the MP, 
is why people did not build in the estate, they 
only did farming. He, however, admitted that 
people were not given adequate notice, and 
an all stakeholders meeting was supposed to 
have been conducted, and not enough notifi-
cation was given (Porusingazi 2014). 
The communities have been allocated a uni-
form 0.5ha per family, which is not adequate 
in all cases to compensate households which 
lost crops in the process of the establishment 
of the project’s dams and canals. The own-
ers of the project at Chisumbanje have tried 
to involve and compensate the farmers who 
lost their land. Macdom Investments set aside 
0.5ha of irrigated portions of land for small-
holder farmers to engage in horticulture pro-
jects to compensate for their losses. The com-
pany provides the farmers with irrigation ser-
vices and gives them logistical support. Fur-
thermore, 241 farmers are also contracted by 
the company to grow sugarcane, which they 
sell to the company.
Conflicts over ‘favourable’ 
land allocation to war 
veterans
There are 6 000ha of land under sugarcane 
in Chisumbanje Estate (Macdom Investments), 
where there are 116 out-growers on 410ha of 
land and 125 war veterans on 250ha of land 
(Zuze GreenFuel, 2014). The company then 
buys sugarcane from the farmers at US$4/
tonnes and the expected yield per hectare 
is 135 tonnes. In Middle Sabi, the company 
is utilising 3 500ha of original ARDA land 
with no displacement of the community, and 
there is a plan to develop 6 000ha in Mid-
dle Sabi for the out-grower scheme under 
the A2 resettlement model of medium-scale 
farms.4 The allocation of a ‘significant’ amount 
of land was interpreted by communities that 
GreenFuel wanted to curry favour with the 
company for political reasons. However, this 
seems to have backfired, as the war veterans 
were then accused by the communities of 
being sell-outs. 
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As can be deciphered from War Veteran 4 
(see Box 1 pg. 13), conflict exists between war 
veterans and the general population. There 
is no doubt that the company provided more 
land and support to war veterans than to ordi-
nary people. They could afford this because 
the war veterans were fewer, they could be 
a source of conflict and negative mobilisation 
that would disrupt the project, and accord-
ing to policy on land, all allocations need to 
meet a 20% quota in terms of the number of 
plots or the size of land, whichever applies. 
Therefore, the company was within the policy 
parameters to provide such concessions. How-
ever, the communities then accused the war 
veterans of selling out and being the spokes-
persons of the company, because of the ben-
efits given to them. 
A war veteran representative said that the 
Chisumbanje Ethanol Investment is tanta-
mount to colonisation, and villagers sug-
gested a halt to their operations until they 
consulted the displaced communities. In spite 
of having been accused of wanting to close 
down the company project through their 
actions, war veterans holding protection-for-
community-benefits placards are typically 
careful to point out that they are not ‘against 
the project’.
Women’s land rights in the 
context of ‘displacement’ 
The investment affected women and men 
differently, which means taking gender as a 
mediating factor in the Chisumbanje Ethanol 
Project. However, by gender profiling, the 
actual effects of the project on women (Behr-
man et al 2011) are missed, given the skewed 
rights that in an African set-up places men 
far ahead of resources ownership and access 
compared to women. This is not new, and 
Paradza (2010), by examining the communal 
areas, challenged the received wisdom that 
women are always disadvantaged. She noted 
misinterpretations and misrepresentations of 
African family structures and the division of 
labour, and how resources are shared in the 
family set-up. Who owns what when it comes 
to looking after families arises as a source of 
conflict when the family is dissolved due to 
divorce or death of a male spouse because of 
cultural methods of handling property (which 
in any case have transformed in the last few 
decades). The heir to property is usually the 
son, but is given responsibility for the whole 
family left behind, hence the concept of own-
ership becomes moot. Nonetheless, in fami-
lies where there are girl children, interference 
from other family members seems to be a key 
issue, though it may not be as widespread as 
in the past.
A dominant thesis around gender in Africa is 
that on any land deal, poor rural women lose 
out because they do not have reliable access 
to land, secure land tenure or customary land 
rights (Gaidzanwa 1985, 1995). Yet Matondi 
(2012) also found that where the state has 
done a ‘land deal’ in the form of the FTLRP, 
women have largely lost out — not just land, 
but are also second best when it comes to the 
resources available to use the land. Invest-
ments in mega-projects on customary lands 
shift household dynamics in terms of their 
roles, income-generation activities and prop-
erty rights. However, a surprising finding was 
that women in Chisumbanje were not lobby-
ing for access to irrigation plots or lost land 
to be ‘their’ personal property, but rather for 
their spouses who had been pushed out or 
incorporated in small-sized land of 0.5ha and 
very far from their places of residence. While 
they acknowledge that some work was done 
in the community (e.g. bridge construction), 
women pointed out that it was not intention-
al development for the community. They indi-
cated that it was a way to facilitate company 
operations, and communities benefited by 
accident. The greatest complaint for women 
was articulated in the following manner:
As women it was promised that projects 
will be established for us. We applied for 
projects and to this day nothing has been 
done towards this. These projects include 
the construction of a chicken run with them 
giving us the chickens which in turn we 
would sell to the company for its workers. 
They promised us a market place, for other 
villages they have done so but for our village 
they have not. They said they would offer us 
employment to cook sadza for the workers 
and would employ people to feed the 
chickens but all this was not done. They did, 
however, construct three boreholes in this 
village, one of which is no longer being used 
as the water is contaminated, the other one’s 
pipes are not enough and have been shut 
down, and the last one is the one working 
4 This is a Fast Track Land 
Reform model administered 
under the Agricultural Land 
Settlement Act (Chapter 
20: 01). The model is said by 
government to increase the 
participation of black indig-
enous farmers in commercial 
farming through the provi-
sion of easier access to land 
and infrastructure on full cost 
recovery basis. The model is to 
empower black entrepreneurs 
through access to land, inputs 
and to close the gap between 
the white and black commercial 
farmers. The land is issued on 
a 99-year lease with an option 
to purchase. Land is allocated 
in the following manner: peri-
urban (2–50 ha.), small-scale 
commercial farm ranged from 
20ha. In AER 1 to 240ha. In AER 
V, medium-scale farm ranged 
from 100ha in AER 1 to 1,000ha 
in AERV, and large-scale ranged 
from 250ha. in AER 1 to 2000 in 
AER V. Interview, Rafael Zuze 
(Assistant General Manager) 




Box 1: Story of War Veteran 4 
I shall speak on behalf of the war veterans and not focus on the community at large. 
As war veterans we went to war mainly to claim back our land. We did not want 
to be located on unfertile rocky territories. So as each person went to war, we had 
the mindset of coming back home to be located on fertile land. Historically we were 
told that in Chisumbanje we would be located in the far, unfertile territories and we 
objected to this under the notion that we had fought for the land. This relocation we 
believed was being caused by the Smith regime so after the war, no one was relocated 
to the unfertile territories of Masvingo and we remained on our land. ARDA had its 
own territory and we were clearly aware of these boundaries. As war veterans come 
the era of land invasions, we decided not to go to Masvingo or any other area but 
we wanted to concentrate on attaining our benefits from our local area. We invaded 
ARDA state land and said we wanted the government to give us land portions in that 
territory. Letters were written and sent to the MLRR and it was agreed to have land 
apportioned at DRC, located further up from ARDA. People got between 3–5ha. 
War Veteran 4 indicated that they were content but we were then told that they 
would be considered as candidates for state land to be distributed later. 
So when the company then came we were already benefiting and we were told not to 
cultivate in that area. As war veterans we complied with this request as we were told 
that we would be given a place to cultivate together with our community. We agreed 
to this as this was a project that was said would benefit the locals and nation at large. 
A lot of promises were made including of dam construction, hospital construction, 
irrigation set up, and that we would be part of the out-grower scheme. We gladly 
welcomed this and although they ploughed down our crops, they said that they would 
compensate us. Some people had about 5ha of land with cotton being destroyed; 
maize was put in a Scotch cart and sold. With that having been done and over time 
we assessed, as war veterans, the progress of the company in terms of helping us. We 
decided to demonstrate and we called upon the community and their response was 
that you as war veterans were the ones whose land was taken and as a result you need 
to go and stand for yourselves and we will do the same. Little did they know that the 
company started getting land from us, the war veterans, and were going to spill over 
to the rest of the community.
The community was reluctant to listen to us and we then proceeded to go and 
demonstrate by ourselves as war veterans. I thought it was clear that I highlight 
the history of the land distribution that ended up happening as the rest of the local 
community could say to you that war veterans are the ones that benefited the most 
from this investment. The community did not agree to assist us and we started to 
make arrangements as a team of about 500 war veterans, all the way from Chipinge 
South and other wards, not only Chisumbanje. We sat down with the company and 
we referred them to the initial promise they made to us that they would consider 
giving us state land. They offered to make us out-growers and they took a group of 
125 war veterans first. Each was given 2ha of planted sugarcane. From this benefit, it 
is necessary to assess the benefits of these 2ha given to the people. This is a challenge. 
All we were told was we have 2ha, not that we know specifically where these 2ha are 
or what it takes to cultivate this land. 
Source: Focused Group Discussion, Chisumbanje 14 May 2014
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(Focused Group Discussion 2014). 
Women living in Chisumbanje reported that 
their farms were in the area taken by the com-
pany, and that people lost land ranging from 
3–10ha. They claim they were not allocated 
irrigable plots as compensation. From a pro-
duction perspective GreenFuel did not, until 
the formation of Vendor Induced Manage-
ment Buyout (VIMBO), a community develop-
ment-based organisation, respond to wom-
en’s demands. Yet women complained how 
they were affected as their rights over family 
property shifted and livelihoods changed to 
fully depend on the company or associated 
companies, depending on GreenFuel prod-
ucts. This material point has been missed in 
most of the gender-type analysis to date. 
We argue that the major change in land and 
resources tenure affected women in diverse 
ways. For some, as family units broken in the 
past by lack of economic opportunities were 
being reconstructed. Prior to the land invest-
ments, the poor rural women of Chisumbanje 
and Chinyamukwakwa often had reliable 
access to land, secure land tenure or custom-
ary land rights, and could do what they liked 
with minimal support from spouses. As wit-
nessed by The Zimbabwe Independent (2013) 
during a tour they ‘...came across George 
Chinyamukwakwa (42), his wife Elizabeth 
Makuyana (28), their two sons Lovemore and 
Robert, harvesting their maize crop. They 
were working together in their field, an 
increasingly rare phenomenon in a Zimbabwe 
whose high unemployment levels have driven 
many across the borders in search of the pro-
verbial greener pastures while tearing fami-
lies apart’ (Moyo 2013). However, not every 
woman has been pleased with the project. 
Historically, some were farming on the plots 
between 1983 and 1998, yet others had only 
started with new families in 2006. Women in 
focus group discussions (FGDs) also pointed 
out that the loss of land affected everyone, 
as the children of traditional leaders lost their 
land, yet others were accommodated in the 
war veterans’ section. The distance (30km 
away) to the new plots and size of the land 
were raised as contested matters. The author-
ities promised that the land was for tempo-
rary use, without any specifics or anything 
written down. They said that men would be 
given sugarcane farms and this 0.5ha was 
meant for the women. The dams to supply 
the irrigated plots are located at the mar-
gin of the sugarcane plantation. The biggest 
problem is a small part of the community got 
the 0.5ha plots, so other members of the com-
munity have no incentive to take care of their 
animals. The villages that were affected are 
Masunde, Bepe, Madwayi, Zuwarekipi and 
Vhutuza. Out of 1 060, only 172 got plots, so 
those with cattle will simply set their animals 
free. 
The narratives from the women are about 
being left out of the project while they see 
developments and other villages benefiting. 
Here is a typical case of inadequate communi-
cation. GreenFuel maintains it can only do so 
much for the community, but cannot solve all 
the community problems. A public relations 
exercise that involved community engage-
ment to explain the phased approach to the 
projects expected for women was underway 
through VIMBO in 2015, when the Ruzivo 
Team was on the ground in April. In raising 
many other issues, this created an impression 
that the community and women have not 
benefited or will not in the long run benefit. 
The company’s business case for profitable 
and sustainable operations, and the sequenc-
ing of community development plans, is not 
getting through to the community. So when 
they see developments in other villages, they 
feel left out and vent anger towards the com-
pany. Their anger reflects the desire for local 
benefits, which needs the collective efforts of 
the communities, the company and govern-
ment and its local structures. A suggestion 
we make for women and youth is the need 
for rotational benefit so that all villages and 
communities feel the reach of the compa-
ny’s economy that comes through multiplier 
effects. 
Dynamics of land use 
transformation 
At the initial stage the company employed 
many locals, with figures of those employed 
by the company rising up to 1 000. With 
increased production and opening of new 
land, GreenFuel indicates that it has 9 100 
permanent and casual employees (GreenFuel 
undated). Greater problems arose in 2011 when 
the company closed due to the low uptake of 
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ethanol in the country. Because of the politics 
that were characteristic of the GNU era, many 
locals were retrenched and when the mill re-
opened they were either replaced by whites 
or blacks from other regions (Key informant 
interview 2014). Chief Garahwa expected the 
investment to benefit the community to a 
greater extent since it took land away from 
the community, changing the livelihood pat-
terns of the local people. However, this seems 
not to be happening as the company is no 
longer fulfilling its promises (Key informant 
interview 2014). A key informant interviewed 
had the following to say:
The so-called investment has done more 
harm than good to the community. The 
community relied on farming as its key 
livelihood activity, with farmers growing cash 
crops and food crops way before GreenFuel 
came into the area. The community used 
to grow cotton as a cash crop and cotton 
companies used to have depots at the 
local business centres where they provided 
farmers with inputs and bought the cotton 
from them. This had seen a boom in the 
local economy with people being able to 
build better houses for themselves, as well 
as a boom at Checheche growth point where 
shops that include banks, hardware, grocery 
shops, car sales and many other services have 
been established. Many parents were able 
to send their children to school through 
cotton production and produced food crops 
with excess grain being sold to the Grain 
Marketing Board (Chief Garahwa 2014). 
Conflicts and resolution  
of compensation
In Chisumbanje the issue of compensation 
is twofold: first, compensation for lost lands 
is contested; second, compensation for lost 
produce as the company admitted to having 
ploughed crops that belonged to the commu-
nity. Communities have raised issues of their 
crops having been destroyed by the com-
pany. A road construction activity led to the 
‘destruction of crops’, which caused a media 
and international outcry. However, GreenFu-
el indicated that field destruction happened 
outside Chinyamukwakwa, in Mangokova, 
where a road was to be constructed. They fur-
ther pointed out that the deal for the open-
ing of the road was agreed with by the DEPIC, 
which was dissolved when the negotiations 
were taken over by traditional leaders. In 
fact, the community was informed a year ear-
lier of the plan for the road, and that Green-
Fuel would open the road when the crops had 
been harvested. Yet when problems arose 
during construction, in front of traditional 
leaders GreenFuel agreed to compensate to 
avoid conflict on a crop that was already har-
vested and paid for, based on expected yields 
as assessed by Agritex. It is also not clear if 
all the destroyed crops were compensated for 
or not, and how the company and the com-
munity planned for food security parameters. 
The company seems to have acknowledged 
and admitted its culpability in the destruction 
of the crops as they gave the following state-
ment:
The company, through their Human Resourc-
es Manager Mr. Zuze, agreed that they ‘are 
responsible for the destruction of crops 
belonging to the residents since 2008; we are 
consulting with Agritex to establish the value 
of the destroyed crops so that we can start 
compensation’. This statement was made 
at a meeting at Chisumbanje on the 18th of 
August 2011. More than one thousand vil-
lagers, including Chief Garahwa, Headman 
Chisumbanje, Chinyamukwakwa and Matik-
wa, attended (South West Radio 23 August 
2011).
However, an important point to observe is 
that the company was not strategic in its han-
dling of the crop that was on the land tar-
geted for production, as directed by ARDA. 
According to Chief Garahwa, instead of tak-
ing a hard-line stance, it would have been 
proper to negotiate directly with the commu-
nities, allow them to harvest and then carry 
out awareness programmes on the precise 
areas where the company was planning to 
plant the following season (Chief Garahwa 
2014). This would not have encouraged the 
politicisation of the issue, and could have 
fostered better relations between the com-
pany and the community. The Government of 
National Unity (GNU) in 2012 waded into the 
issue and provided recommendations:
The Company should immediately 
compensate and resettle the 117 households 
that had offer letters and were displaced 
from ARDA estates. With Government and 
ARDA supervision, the Company should 
16
Zimbabwe’s new land crisis: Large-scale land investments at Chisumbanje
engage the farmers directly and pay the 
compensation in lieu of the land user rights 
that were lost, and negotiate terms for the 
farmers to continue to live on the estates as 
out-growers and producers to the Ethanol 
Project. Of the 117 farmers who held sub-
leases in ARDA estates, 116 have stayed on 
as out-growers of sugarcane to the Project. 
Their major grievances have been non-
payment of compensation for land user 
rights and slow payment for cane delivered 
to the project in the 2010/2011 season. Of 
the total, US$196 800 due to the farmers for 
that season, US$161 800 had been paid and 
US$35 000 was outstanding and was only 
paid on 14 September 2012. All payments to 
these farmers are effected through ARDA. 
With Government and ARDA supervision, the 
Company should go into direct arrangements 
for payment of these farmers, and should 
avoid delays in paying for crop deliveries 
(Mutambara Press Statement 2012).
It seems that prior planning was not partici-
patory as communities were not aware that 
certain parts of the land they were using were 
targeted for sugarcane production. Such tar-
geting needed to specify the timing and also 
announce when the land would be needed 
by the company so that communities will not 
commit resources (finance, seeds, fertilisers, 
chemicals, tillage and labour), only to see 
them ploughed up by the company. Acknowl-
edgement on its own is not enough and com-
pensation needs to be paid, as affirmed by 
the mission and report of Deputy President 
(Mutambara 2012). However, there seems 
to be no follow-up discussion of what this 
lost land (used for securing food security) 




A thorough analysis of the global trends in 
land investment and Zimbabwe’s own invest-
ment policy indicates that the Chisumbanje 
Ethanol Project does not fit the land grab 
discourse of the international dimensions 
mentioned above, for a variety of reasons. 
Though issues of land displacement are con-
textual and real, it would seem that issues of 
community benefit is a priority matter across 
all stakeholders, including GreenFuel itself. 
Interviews, including community members, 
traditional leaders, officials in government 
and a variety of technocrats in government at 
national level, point out that GreenFuel is a 
national project with a national status, where 
negotiations for land was done directly at 
the highest level of government. In an inter-
view with a senior government official on 
27 April 2014, and affirmed at a meeting of 
technical directors, government officials were 
open and clear that land issues matter little 
because Zimbabwe is not short of it. Rather, 
they would like to look at ethanol as a first 
test case for land expansion, which is availa-
ble for small- to large-scale producers of etha-
nol and other energy-related crops for import 
substitution, as well as allowing for economic 
development enablers. 
State authorities are aware that there are 
local community contestations and have sent 
in a high level government team for resolving 
land-related conflicts in Chisumbanje, Trian-
gle and Hippo Valley estates. Beyond the dis-
course of ‘land grabs’ are diverse experiences, 
which need proper contextualisation, rather 
than firm conclusions being drawn from one 
case. Stakeholders with power also need 
to be part of the greater dialogue. Clearly, 
the purpose of ‘government is to govern’ 
(Mbiriri 2015), and in this case, Zimbabwe 
needs energy, while protecting the people 
from unfair and unequal treatment, wher-
ever any investment is undertaken. 
The first large-scale investment in energy and 
commercial agriculture since 2000 has brought 
up several points. There are no other invest-
ments, outside of hydro and thermal energy, 
as well as road improvements. The point of 
government is that ‘doing something rather 
than nothing’ is better in getting the energy 
sector play its role as an enabler for economic 
growth and development’ (Mbiriri 2015). Cer-
tain realities escape analysts of Chisumbanje. 
This is why we presented the evidence we got 
from both supporters and those who oppose 
the project, be it for economic, political and 
other reasons: the first reality is that Green-
Fuel Company is leasing land from ARDA and 
has little say on land-related matters, and only 
waits for instructions from ARDA on where to 
plant sugarcane. This means government has 
the strongest say on land ownership, so issues 
that arise on land-related matters should be 
addressed to government and not the com-
pany.
Second, government is a shareholder in the 
project with the same rights as GreenFuel 
Company, which is the reason why ARDA is 
central to the project. ARDA claims that it has 
more land in the area that it has not been 
using for generations and had ceded the land 
on a temporary basis for the use by communi-
ties. While this on its own does not take away 
the rights of the communities who have his-
torically been in the area, local communities 
have not taken ARDA and Chipinge RDC to 
court. Chiefs in the area indicated that they 
have been aware of these arrangements since 
1964. However, a problem then arises that for 
generations, communities have established 
themselves on state land, and their removal 
would seem to violate their tenure rights, 
which is why delicate and sensitive negotia-
tions have to take place. 
Third, it is critical to engage with traditional 
chiefs, yet in the case of Chisumbanje there 
have been contradictory statements from the 
traditional leadership. Engaging in conversa-
tion is crucial, and the international guide-
lines could be helpful. It would seem that 
Chief Garahwa was more concerned with 
the promises made than the land issue. In 
an interview he noted that when GreenFuel 
came in, they made promises to him as a chief 
and to the community as a whole, which they 
are not fulfilling, and the investment is no 
Is the Chisumbanje Ethanol 
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longer benefiting the community as initially 
promised. According to Chief Garahwa, prob-
lems arose when ARDA invaded people’s land 
when it was common knowledge that ARDA 
had its own land (which was fenced) and 
everyone knew the boundaries. During the 
invasion of the people’s land, the GreenFuel 
Company, as directed by ARDA as to where to 
do the phased development, destroyed crops 
which were ready for harvesting. Though 
these crops were compensated for, it did not 
please local people. Headman Chisumbanje, 
presiding over sixteen villages with ten of 
the sixteen affected by the land displacement 
carried out by Macdom Investments, pointed 
out that people used to grow maize for food 
and cotton as a cash crop, and were able to 
build houses using the proceeds from cotton. 
During better seasons they would sell excess 
grain to the GMB. Yet most of the families 
who lost their land can no longer grow food 
and cotton for sale; even their cattle do not 
have anywhere to graze. 
However, the Chief and the Headman admit-
ted that they were consulted on behalf of the 
community and that is why they carried out a 
traditional ceremony to bless the investment. 
While there were indeed contested land 
issues, with communities displaced and com-
pensation required, the displacement is not on 
the scale of international land grabs of large 
proportions. Eventually GreenFuel will end 
up with 40 000ha across several estates and 
at least three processing plants (Chisimbanje, 
Middle Sabi and Nuanetsi) of a similar size, 
all modelled around core estates and comple-
mented by out-growers. While displacement 
is displacement, some would argue the con-
text needs to be put in perspective. First, it is 
the manner in which such displacement takes 
place that requires examination; in this case, 
the state is to blame because it was in charge 
of directing where GreenFuel could go. It 
therefore remains erroneous and disingenu-
ous to blame the company that literally has 
no land and is under a Joint Venture with the 
state, which retains all rights over land. 
Second, it also has to be said that the com-
pany has not refused land compensation. The 
compensation has been slow but is being paid, 
which makes the investment party compli-
ant with AU and FAO land policy guidelines. 
Constraining economic high costs of doing 
business affects the project performance and 
what it can deliver to the communities that 
are greatly in need of development, which at 
times is beyond the scope of what it can pro-
vide. 
Third, GreenFuel could also have done better 
in its negotiations with ARDA, the Chipinge 
RDC and MLRR on land-related matters. Gov-
ernment has seen potential in biofuels and 
already 62 countries have mandatory blend-
ing. The draft Biofuels Policy is being consid-
ered for wider investor beneficiation (domes-
tic and international) because targeted land 
available after the Fast Track Land Reform 
Programme. Nonetheless, GreenFuel was 
squeezed by the politics of Zimbabwe and 
could not produce ethanol for blending for 
almost three years until 2013, delaying com-
pensation to the communities. 
Fourth, it would seem that the former Dep-
uty Prime Minister, by coming down hard on 
the company, seemed to have lost sight of 
the fact that ARDA (and government para-
statals under his government) had approved 
all the plans and was in the forefront of the 
land ‘give away’. It is unclear why the Deputy 
Prime Minister did not engage with the para-
statals such as ARDA which are responsible for 
land and which hold significant shares. This 
context needs to be taken seriously beyond 
the international agreements (voluntary or 
otherwise) to address the needs of the com-
munities. Such solutions to a national project 
need to be provided in a context of non-con-
frontation and non-politicisatioin. As seen 
through the related investments that have 
come courtesy of the ethanol production by 
GreenFuel, the benefits to the local economy 
are not being disputed by the communities. 
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ject is a strategic investment for government 
at national level. Ethanol development in 
Chisumbanje is premised upon the develop-
ment of ‘marginal’ and ‘unproductive’ land to 
generate benefits such as energy security and 
independence, efficient irrigation schemes, 
smallholder out-grower schemes, job crea-
tion, electric power generation and the stim-
ulation of downstream industries. Most local 
people, particularly displaced farmers, felt 
they had been left worse off than they would 
be without the biofuel investment. There is a 
clear collision between national interests and 
local communities in Chisumbanje. The state 
envisions biofuel development as a pathway 
to development — an economic opportunity 
to energy independence — while the locals 
see it as a threat to their livelihoods. 
Rather than being merely ‘marginal’ or 
‘unproductive’, the land appropriated for eth-
anol development was crucial for land-based 
livelihood activities such as food and cash-
crop farming, livestock production and direct 
natural resource use, among other income 
sources (Thondhlana 2014). Some of these 
income sources were reported to be increas-
ingly insecure due to recurrent droughts, for 
example, maize crop farming. However, other 
drought-resistant crops, such as sorghum, and 
activities such as cotton farming and livestock 
production, represented a buffer against 
fluctuations in other income sources. Lands 
perceived as marginal by the state and large 
private investors do, in most cases, provide a 
vital basis for the livelihoods of poorer and 
vulnerable groups (Benjaminsen et al., 2006; 
Hall, 2011; Nalepa and Bauer, 2012). The etha-
nol policy processes and direction should be 
informed and guided by the realisation that 
the dry land communal farming system in 
Chisumbanje has multiple production objec-
tives, which form part of the local way of 
adapting to income stresses.
Political and private interests may underlie 
the seemingly noble shift towards ethanol 
production, which breeds winners and los-
ers in emerging ethanol development pro-
jects (Shattuck 2009). The Government of 
Zimbabwe may have been especially keen to 
satisfy the needs of ethanol investors, because 
they are some of the few private investors 
who were prepared to sidestep international 
concerns about the country’s political prob-
lems. Thus, from a policy perspective, it is also 
important to understand the political config-
urations that shape pro-ethanol production 
arguments. Furthermore, the extent to which 
national policy legal frameworks provide ade-
quate safeguards for local land and resource 
access rights, and effective mechanisms for 
local participation in decision making, will 
frame whether increased ethanol investments 
and initiatives will translate into new oppor-
tunities for or further marginalisation of local 
communities. More powerful individuals 
and groups of people have greater access to 
resources, such as irrigated land.
The trajectory of the Chisumbanje case 
revealed that the investors are struggling to 
find a balanced model in relation to fair com-
pensation to the local people for land and 
losses in crops. The Chisumbanje case reflects 
that the immense potential opportunities 
anticipated, in diverting a natural resource, 
such as land and water from the small-scale 
farmer to the large-scale commercial farm-
ing project, requires greater stakeholder 
coherence in their approach to addressing 
design elements, while working collabora-
tively to ensure that no one party is preju-
diced. An empirical study of the Chisumbanje 
case shows that there are both positive and 
negative consequences to the project. There 
is a compelling case for more grounded com-
munity development approaches beyond 
the company in order for the local people to 
secure their livelihoods. The locals feel dis-
empowered and more marginalised, despite 
some of them getting menial jobs. In the long 
term, there is a need for incremental develop-
ment to level the playing field for a win-win 
situation for the company and the local com-
munities, but this can start only if and when 
dialogue commences with all the players.
Conclusion
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